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The Low Water Mark for Beach Access: Defending 
Government Protection of Intertidal Recreation as a 
Lawful Exercise of State Power 
17 U.N.H. L. Rev. 287 (2019) 
A B S T R A C T .  Beaches are a natural resource ideally suited for public recreation.  The public 
generally has a right to access this intertidal land, but the purpose and scope of public access vary 
greatly between states.  Consistent with national trends toward greater public access, the 
legislatures of Massachusetts and Maine have attempted to expand public beach access rights to 
include the right to engage in general recreation below the mean high tide line.  However, the 
Supreme Judicial Courts of both states have declared that such legislation would be an 
unconstitutional taking of property requiring compensation to the abutting landowners and held 
that public rights of access are limited to the traditional purposes of fishing, fowling, and 
navigation.  In doing so, the high courts of both states stymied a natural progression toward 
greater public intertidal rights based on a colonial city ordinance enacted in 1641.  I argue that 
legislative determinations about the most socially valuable uses of intertidal land should be given 
significant weight, particularly in light of the inherent flexibility of public access rights and a 
national trend expanding beach access.  Thus, in this Article, I argue that the state legislatures can 
broaden the public’s right to beach access without constituting a taking.  In doing so, the Article 
provides a roadmap for how legislatures, including those in Massachusetts and Maine, can draft 
legislation broadening beach access rights that can withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
A U T H O R .  Associate, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, Washington, D.C.; J.D. Harvard Law 
School; B.A., University of Connecticut.  I am grateful to Joe Singer, Angela Howe, and Staley Prom 
for their valuable input.  I am also grateful to my family and friends for their willingness to indulge 
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I NT R ODUC T I ON 
The public has long enjoyed an inherent right to access and use the intertidal 
zone, the land between the low and high tides.  However, the public’s beach access 
needs have evolved in the hundreds of years since these rights were initially 
established.  Modern courts and legislatures have responded by expanding the 
purposes for which the public may access the beach and the area of beach to which 
it has access.  Despite this national trend, the courts of Massachusetts and Maine 
have drastically limited the public’s beach access rights.  There, the public may only 
access the intertidal land for the traditional purposes of fishing, fowling, and 
navigation.  
The Massachusetts and Maine legislatures have both attempted to broaden the 
public’s rights to include general recreation, but the Supreme Judicial Courts of 
both states have declared that such legislation would be an unconstitutional taking 
of property requiring compensation to the abutting landowners.  I argue that courts 
should defer to legislative determinations about the most socially valuable uses of 
intertidal land, particularly in light of the inherent flexibility of public access rights 
and a national trend expanding beach access.  Thus, in this Article, I argue that the 
state legislatures could grant this recreational right of access without constituting 
a taking. 
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I .  MA I NE ,  MA S S A C HUS E T T S ,  A ND T HE  C OL ONI A L  OR DI N AN C E  
At English common law, the land between the high and low tide lines was held 
by the Crown for the benefit of the public.1  This land was held as two associated 
classes of rights: the jus privatum, the private right, and the jus publicum, the public 
right.2  The jus publicum provided the citizens the right to access the seashore for 
socially valuable purposes such as fishing and navigation.3  While the private right 
in the property was alienable, the public right remained impressed upon the land 
even after it had been transferred.4 
Following the American Revolution, the intertidal land passed from the Crown 
to the colonies, and then to the states, still encumbered by these public rights.5  The 
states therefore possessed all land below the high tide line and held it subject to an 
inalienable requirement that it be used for the benefit of the public.6 
Today, the public’s right of access to the shoreline varies across states.  Hawaii 
allows for the public use of land above the high tide line, extending to all dry sand.7  
New Jersey requires that the public be given reasonable access to the shoreline, 
which could include allowing access over private property.8  Most coastal states 
recognize a right to engage in recreation on whatever land is available.9 
Despite the general trend in favor of broad recreational beach access, two states 
                                                                    
1  Timothy M. Mulvaney & Brian Weeks, “Waterlocked”: Public Access to New Jersey’s Coastline, 34 
Ecology L.Q. 579, 582–84 (2007) (citing Justinian I, The Institutes of Justinian with English 
Introduction, Translation, and Notes 91 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., 7th ed. 1941)).  For a 
detailed account of the public trust doctrine, see Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural 
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970). 
2  Jose L. Fernandez, Untwisting the Common Law: Public Trust and the Massachusetts Colonial 
Ordinance, 62 Alb. L. Rev. 623, 627 (1998). 
3  Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 1, at 582. 
4  Id. at 583–84. 
5  Fernandez, supra note 2, at 629; see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 473 
(1988) (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894)) (“Upon the American Revolution, these rights, 
charged with a like trust, were vested in the original States within their respective borders . . . .”). 
6  Fernandez, supra note 2, at 624. 
7  In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 77 (Haw. 1968). 
8  Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984). 
9  Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983); Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 
28 v. State, 222 P.3d 441, 451 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009); Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 73 (Mich. 2005); 
Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 (N.J. 1972); Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 
S.E.2d 187, 194 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015); Cavanaugh v. Town of Narragansett, 1997 WL 1098081, at *9 
(R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 1997); Movrich v. Lobermeier, 889 N.W.2d 454, 465 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016). 
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have retained unusually restrictive approaches to public access.10  Massachusetts 
and Maine have extended private ownership to include the intertidal land and allow 
public access only for the purposes of fishing, fowling, and navigation.11  This 
anomaly has historical roots in Massachusetts that predate the creation of the 
United States.12 
Following the English tradition, private land ownership in colonial 
Massachusetts originally extended only to the high tide line while everything below 
that line was owned by the colony for the benefit of the public.13  The public’s right 
to use this land was codified by a Massachusetts Bay Colony city ordinance in 1641, 
which granted the public the right to “free fishing and fowling in any great ponds, 
bays, coves, and rivers, so far as the sea ebbs and flows . . . .”14 
However, the colony needed shipping wharves and could not afford to build 
them with public funds.15  In order to incentivize private wharf construction, the 
ordinance was amended in 164716 to grant the intertidal land to abutting 
landowners, with the hopes that they would build wharves themselves on their 
newly acquired land.17  The 1647 amendment thus extended private ownership from 
the average high tide line to the average low tide line while retaining the public’s 
access rights for fishing, fowling, and navigation.18 
That ordinance was soon annulled, but it resurfaced 150 years later in Storer v. 
Freeman.19  Chief Justice Parsons stated that although the ordinance was no longer 
in effect, “a usage has prevailed, which now has force as our common law, that the 
owner of lands bounded on the sea . . . shall hold [title] to [the] low water mark . . . 
                                                                    
10  See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 172 (Me. 1989); Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 438 
(1810). 
11  See Bell, 557 A.2d at 172; Storer, 6 Mass. at 438. 
12  See Bell, 557 A.2d at 172; Storer, 6 Mass. at 438. 
13  Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 89 N.E. 124, 124 (Mass. 1909); Commonwealth v. 
Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 66 (1851); Storer, 6 Mass. at 438. 
14  Alger, 61 Mass. at 67. 
15  Storer, 6 Mass. at 438. 
16  See Alger, 61 Mass. at 67–68 (noting new provisions were “probably passed” in 1647); see also 
Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 565 (Mass. 1974) (“This was accomplished by what has 
become known as the colonial ordinance of 1641–47, which is found in the 1649 codification.”).  See 
generally Storer, 6 Mass. at 438. 
17  See Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 565; Alger, 61 Mass. at 68. 
18  Alger, 61 Mass. at 67–70. 
19  Storer, 6 Mass. at 438. 
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.”20  Further, “[a]lthough strictly the ordinance was limited to the area of 
Massachusetts Bay Colony, it has long been interpreted as effecting a grant of the 
tidal land to all coastal owners in the Commonwealth.”21  Therefore, private owners 
along the entire coast of Massachusetts possessed title to the intertidal land.22 
This ordinance has since become the final word on Massachusetts beach 
access.23  In 1974, in an attempt to bring Massachusetts into conformity with the 
general trend of other coastal states, the Massachusetts House of Representatives 
proposed legislation expanding public access.24  The proposed act would have 
granted a “public on-foot free right-of-passage up to the mean high water line,” 
subject to certain restrictions.25  It therefore expanded the uses of the public trust 
property beyond the traditional categories of fishing, fowling, and navigation. 
The House requested an advisory opinion from the Supreme Judicial Court 
(SJC)26 as to whether the proposed bill would be an unconstitutional taking of 
private property without just compensation.27  The SJC framed its inquiry around 
the 1647 ordinance amendment.28  The court stated that to satisfy the Constitution, 
the right-of-way had to be a “natural derivative” of the public’s existing access 
rights.29  The court found that an on-foot right-of-passage was not “reasonably 
related” to the exercise of the rights granted in the ordinance.30  The court therefore 
held that the proposed Act would be a taking of private property requiring just 
compensation as a categorical “permanent physical intrusion.”31 
                                                                    
20  Id. 
21  Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 566 (citing Weston v. Sampson, 8 Cush. 347, 353–54 (1851)). 
22  Id. 
23  Alger, 61 Mass. at 69-70; Barker v. Bates, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 255, 258 (1832); see Opinion of the 
Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 566 (citing Weston, 8 Cush. at 353–54). 
24  See Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 563. 
25  Id. at 564.  The right-of-way was not available before sunrise or after sunset, in areas protected 
by the Department of Natural Resources, or where there was a structure, enclosure, or other 
improvement.  Id. 
26  Both Maine and Massachusetts refer to their highest court as “Supreme Judicial Court.”  Bell 
v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989); Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435 (1810). 
27  Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 565, 568. 
28  See id. at 566. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. at 566, 568. 
31  Id. at 568. 
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The 1647 ordinance has similar controlling authority in Maine.32  In 1986, 
Maine’s legislature passed The Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act.33  The Act 
provided a right of access to “use intertidal land for recreation” and granted “any 
other trust rights to use intertidal land recognized by the Maine common law . . . .”34  
In a holding that scholars have found anomalous,35 the Maine SJC invalidated the 
statute and upheld a private owner’s quiet title action to an area of beachfront.36  The 
court analyzed the statute in light of the 1647 ordinance and heavily relied upon the 
Massachusetts SJC advisory opinion.37 
Both states’ legislatures have thus attempted to expand public beach access 
rights to allow uses beyond fishing, fowling, and navigation.38  At the same time, 
most coastal states had already broadened public access rights beyond the 
traditional categories.39  Some states went further and expanded the public’s access 
rights to land above the high tide line.40  Despite this trend across the West Coast,41 
                                                                    
32  Maine was once part of Massachusetts but separated in 1820.  Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 
168, 172 (Me. 1989).  The Massachusetts Act of Separation stated: “[a]ll Grants of land . . . which 
have been . . . made by the said Commonwealth [of Massachusetts], before the separation of said 
District [of Maine] shall take place, and having . . . effect within the said district, shall continue in 
full force . . . .”  Id. (citing Massachusetts Act of Separation, Mass. Laws 1819, ch. 161, § 1 Seventh).  
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine thus incorporated the ordinance into Maine common law.  
Lapish v. President of the Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85, 93 (1831). 
33  1985 Me. Laws 782 (codified as amended at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 12, § 573 (2018)); Bell, 557 A.2d 
at 176. 
34  1985 Me. Laws 782 (codified as amended at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 12, § 573). 
35  Hope M. Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of Takings 
Jurisprudence?: The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on Wetlands and Coastal Barrier 
Beaches, 19 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 55-56 (1995) (describing the case as the “only . . . instance in 
which an assertion of public trust authority has been declared unconstitutional”). 
36  Bell, 557 A.2d at 169, 190–91. 
37  Id. at 174. 
38  See 1985 Me. Laws 782 (codified as amended at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 12, § 573); Opinion of the 
Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 563 (Mass. 1974). 
39  See cases cited supra note 9. 
40  Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).  The court did not address 
the extent of this reasonable access over private property.  Id. at 369 (“All we decide here is that 
private land is not immune from a possible right of access to the foreshore for swimming or 
bathing purposes, nor is it immune from the possibility that some of the dry sand may be used by 
the public incidental to the right of bathing and swimming.”); Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 
S.E.2d 187, 195 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 678 (Or. 1969). 
41  Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983); Thornton, 462 P.2d at 673.  
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Hawaii,42 and much of the East Coast,43 Massachusetts and Maine remain trapped 
by a city ordinance passed prior to the ratification of the Constitution.44 
I argue that state legislatures in Massachusetts, Maine, and other coastal states 
may expand the public’s beach access rights without constituting a taking.  
Specifically, this Article shows that legislation granting the public the right to use 
the land below the mean high tide line for general recreation would not be an 
unconstitutional taking because it reflects a background principle of state law.45 
I I .  L E GI S L AT I ON P E R MI T T I NG P UB L I C  AC C E S S  F O R  GE N E R AL  
R E C R E AT I ON B E L OW T HE  ME A N HI GH T I DE  L I N E  WOUL D N OT  
C ONS T I T UT E  A T AK I NG 
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from forcing “some people 
alone to bear public burdens, which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
                                                                    
42  In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968). 
43  Matthews, 471 A.2d at 369; Nies, 780 S.E.2d at 195; Cavanaugh v. Town of Narragansett, 1997 
WL 1098081, at *9 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 1997). 
44  See Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (Mass. 1974). 
45  This Article only addresses the question of whether expansion of public beach access should 
be precluded from takings inquiry altogether because it falls within a background principle of 
state law.  This Article does not consider whether such legislation would constitute a categorical 
physical invasion taking or whether it should instead be analyzed under the more lenient Penn 
Central test.  See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–25 (1978).  
Many scholars and jurists believe that the application of per se rules in takings jurisprudence is 
unhelpful and counterproductive.  Andrea Peterson has argued that courts should not, and in fact 
have not, actually treated cases involving physical invasion as per se takings without considering 
the purpose of the government’s actions.  Andrea L. Peterson, The False Dichotomy Between Physical 
and Regulatory Takings Analysis: A Critique of Tahoe-Sierra’s Distinction Between Physical and 
Regulatory Takings, 34 Ecology L.Q. 381 (2007); see also Joseph William Singer, Justifying Regulatory 
Takings, 41 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 601, 633 (2015) (“[T]he so-called categorical or per se takings are merely 
applications of the three [Penn Central] factors); id. at 661 (arguing that courts should and do 
consider the justifications for the government’s action when determining whether compensation 
is required).  For examples of justices applying ad hoc balancing rather than per se treatment, see 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (reiterating her view 
that Penn Central is the appropriate method of analyzing takings claims rather than adoption of 
per se rules); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(discussing Penn Central).  For analysis of the Massachusetts and Maine legislation under the 
traditional takings rubric, see Sharon M. P. Nicholls, Note, Public Right of Passage Along the 
Massachusetts Coast: An Argument for Implementation Without Compensation, 4 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 113, 
114, 128–29 (1994) (arguing that the legislation should not be considered a per se taking because it 
is not a “new” physical invasion). 
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the public as a whole.”46  The United States Supreme Court has “resist[ed] the 
temptation to adopt per se rules”47 in this area, and has instead considered a holistic, 
multifactor approach to determine whether a regulation “goes too far.”48  Under the 
test announced in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,49 a court should 
consider the economic impact of the regulation, the regulation’s interference with 
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.50  In 
some cases, a single factor can reach such an “extreme form” that it is not only 
important, but determinative.51  Such “categorical takings” are limited to instances 
in which a regulation imposes a “permanent physical occupation,”52 or “denies all 
economically beneficial . . . use of land.”53 
In holding that the denial of all economic use is a categorical taking, the Court 
also acknowledged a limitation to such claims.  The Court in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council54 recognized that a regulation is not an unconstitutional taking if it 
prohibits a use that is already proscribable by “background principles of the State’s 
law of property . . . .”55 
Thus, “the Lucas decision fundamentally revised all takings analysis by making 
the nature of the landowner’s property rights a threshold issue in every case.”56  The 
“background principles of state law” question has therefore developed into a 
categorical rule, which can bar otherwise valid takings claims.57 
Based on this “background principles” defense, legislation expanding the 
                                                                    
46  Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
47  Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326 (2002). 
48  Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
49  438 U.S. 104, 123–25 (1978). 
50  Id. at 124; see, e.g., Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633–34 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the Penn 
Central test). 
51  Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
52  Id. 
53  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1019 (1992); Michael C. Blumm & Lucus 
Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 
Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 321, 321 (2005) (“Justice Scalia’s opinion [in Lucas] . . . declared that a 
regulation depriving a landowner of all economic value was a categorical constitutional taking of 
private property for public use requiring government compensation regardless of the public 
purpose served by the regulation.”). 
54  505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
55  Id. at 1029. 
56  Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 322. 
57  See id. at 327–28. 
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public’s rights to include recreation would not be a taking requiring compensation.  
First, section A introduces the concept of background principles that can serve as a 
defense to a takings claim and demonstrate that the public trust doctrine is an 
example of such a background principle.  Second, section B argues that legislation 
may reflect a background principle even if it announces a rule not yet adopted as a 
matter of state common law.  Finally, section C argues that legislative expansion of 
the public rights to include recreational use below the mean high tide line is a valid 
application of the public trust doctrine as a background principle.  In doing so, I 
provide methods by which a future legislature could craft a law that will comport 
with reasonable applications of relevant precedent and also create broad public 
access rights.   
A.  The Public Trust Doctrine Is a Background Principle of State Law 
The State regulation is not a taking if it reflects a preexisting limitation that 
merely duplicates the result that could have been achieved by the courts pursuant to 
a background principle of state law.58  Legislation that reflects a background 
principle cannot be a taking of property because the prohibited use was never a stick 
in the owner’s bundle of rights in the first place.59  Instead, such a limitation is 
merely one that “inhere[s] in the title itself.”60 
 While the background principles formulation first appeared in Lucas, it is not a 
new concept in takings jurisprudence.61  Rather, it is rooted in the “noxious use 
doctrine,” or “nuisance exception,” which has existed as long as regulatory takings 
themselves.62  In 1887, the Court in Mugler v. Kansas63 upheld regulations prohibiting 
alcohol production, holding that state action does not constitute a taking when it 
imposes a “prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are 
declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the 
community . . . .”64  Thus, the nuisance exception ensured that states would be able 
to exercise their police powers without being required to compensate any 
                                                                    
58  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
59  Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 325. 
60  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
61  See id. at 1047–50 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing history of “noxious use” doctrine and 
collecting cases). 
62  Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), is recognized as the birth of regulatory takings; see 
also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1047–50 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 325 
n.24. 
63  123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
64  Id. at 668. 
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landowner whose interests were adversely affected.65 
The Court in Lucas did not accept South Carolina’s application of the “noxious 
use” doctrine, but affirmed the doctrine’s theoretical underpinnings with the 
background principles exception.66  Thus, the long-recognized concept that the 
regulatory takings doctrine “does not immunize owners from the rule of law or 
democratic governance”67 was reaffirmed in Lucas, not rejected.  If anything, Lucas 
arguably broadened the concept because background principles, unlike the 
nuisance exception, apply to government action that is benefit-conferring as well as 
harm-preventing.68 
State courts have recognized a variety of property law concepts as background 
principles that preclude regulatory takings claims, including the natural use 
doctrine,69 custom,70 water rights,71 and the wildlife trust.72  The public trust 
doctrine has been applied as a background principle by courts in Massachusetts,73 
the Supreme Court of South Carolina,74 the Ninth Circuit,75 and the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court.76 
                                                                    
65  Id. at 667–68. 
66  See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 333 (arguing that the “background principles” defense 
is actually more protective of governmental action because it is (1) analyzed prior to the merits of 
the takings claim and (2) “not limited to harm-preventing . . . restrictions”); Richard J. Lazarus, 
Putting the Correct “Spin” on Lucas, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1411, 1426 (1993) (“The Court engaged in a shell 
game by pointedly rejecting a ‘noxious’ or ‘harmful use’ exception to the Takings Clause, only to 
adopt its analytical equivalent dubbed ‘background principles of nuisance and property law.’”). 
67  Singer, supra note 45, at 608. 
68  See Carol Necole Brown, The Categorical Lucas Rule and the Nuisance and Background Principles 
Exception, 30 Tauro L. Rev. 349, 359 (2014); Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 333; Lazarus, supra 
note 66, at 1426. 
69  See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Wis. 1972); Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, 
at 344. 
70  See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456–57 (Or. 1993); Blumm & Ritchie, supra 
note 53, at 347. 
71  See W. Maricopa Combine, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Water Res., 26 P.3d 1171, 1180 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2001); Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 350. 
72  See State v. Sour Mountain Realty, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d 28, 84 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); Blumm & 
Ritchie, supra note 53, at 352. 
73  See Wilson v. Commonwealth, 583 N.E.2d 894, 901 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992). 
74  See McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119 (S.C. 2003). 
75  See Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying 
Washington law). 
76  See R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 628 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Wis. 2001). 
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The public trust doctrine is a quintessential background principle of state law.77  
Conveyance of trust property is made “subject to the right of the public.”78  The jus 
publicum cannot be alienated from public trust property, and title to such property 
is therefore “different in character [than ordinary land].”79  The foundational 
premise of the public trust doctrine is that the right to exclude the public from using 
the property for its benefit was never a stick in the owner’s bundle of rights.80  Thus, 
it is a quality that “inhere[s] in the title itself.”81 
Further, states have been given great latitude in defining background 
principles.82  While federal courts could theoretically limit what may serve as a 
background principle as a matter of federal constitutional law, the inquiry is so 
intertwined with quintessential state law issues that close scrutiny would offend 
our notions of federalism.83  Moreover, given the pronouncement that “states have 
the power to define the limits of the land held in public trust,”84 it is unlikely that the 
Court would review and reject a state’s interpretation of the public trust doctrine as 
a background principle of state law.85 
B.  Background Principles Can Evolve Over Time 
The background principles defense protects legislation prohibiting conduct 
that “was always unlawful.”86  Laws that proscribe uses already prohibited by state 
                                                                    
77  See, e.g., Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 341–42. 
78  Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972). 
79  Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). 
80  See id.; Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 341–42. 
81  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
82  See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 364–65. 
83  See id.at 364-65 (discussing federalism concerns relating to federal resolution of “background 
principles”); see also Lazarus, supra note 66, at 1430 (noting that the background principles’ focus 
on state property and tort law could lead federal courts to abstain from considering the issue). 
84  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988). 
85  The Court has repeatedly refused to grant certiorari to review the “background principles” 
issue.  Over Justice Scalia’s dissent, the Court refused to review Oregon’s application of custom as 
a “background principle” to reject a takings claim.  See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 
1207, 1209–14 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  The Oregon Supreme Court 
had rejected a takings challenge to the state’s denial of a building permit that would have 
interfered with the public’s customary right to access the beach.  See Stevens v. City of Cannon 
Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 450–51 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1207; see also Blumm & Ritchie, supra 
note 53, at 347–49 (discussing the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Stevens). 
86  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992). 
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law cannot be takings because, simply put, nothing was taken; the legislature is 
merely “duplicat[ing] the result that could have been achieved in the courts—by 
adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State’s law of 
private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate [public] 
nuisances . . . .”87 
However, this does not mean that the legislature can pass laws based in 
background principles only in ways that have been explicitly resolved by the 
common law.88  Rather, making “implications of those background principles . . . 
explicit”89 necessarily involves a level of interpretation by the legislature of what 
those background principles entail.  Thus, in Lucas, the Court held that a state is free 
to apply a background principle to meet contemporary needs as long as the 
application is “objectively reasonable.”90 
Giving guidance in this area, Justice Scalia explained that background 
principles include instances in which “changed circumstances or new knowledge . . 
. make what was previously permissible no longer so.”91  As an example, he explained 
that “the corporate owner of a nuclear generating plant, when it is directed to 
remove all improvements from its land upon discovery that the plant sits astride an 
earthquake fault,” would not be entitled to compensation.92  Thus, “new knowledge” 
about a fault line would allow the government to physically invade the property, to 
deprive the owner of all economically beneficial use, to condemn the plant, or to do 
anything else it may choose to do to prevent the harm.93  Clearly, background 
principles of state law are not static, but can be adapted to suit modern needs. 
Again, this is not a new concept in takings jurisprudence.  In finding zoning 
restrictions constitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1926 consulted the law of 
nuisance “not for the purpose of controlling, but for the helpful aid of its 
analogies.”94  As Professor Humbach has stated: 
Indeed, no such narrow reading of state legislatures’ land-use powers, limiting 
them to re-enacting the common law of nuisance, is supported by precedent. . . . The 
                                                                    
87  Id. at 1029; see, e.g., M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding 
that prohibition on plaintiff’s mining rights was not a taking because plaintiffs “never acquired 
the right to mine in such a way as to endanger the public health and safety”). 
88  See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030–31; Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 343. 
89  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030. 
90  Id. at 1032 n.18. 
91  Id. at 1031. 
92  Id. at 1029. 
93  See id. at 1029, 1031. 
94  Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387–88 (1926). 
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Court has plainly acknowledged that legislatures have greater power by using language 
such as “akin to a public nuisance” and “nuisance-like” to describe [the] kinds of land 
uses a legislature may restrict . . . . Even more to the point, the Court has consistently 
upheld legislatures’ power to restrict a wide variety of undesirable uses and activities 
not considered nuisances at common law . . . .95 
Thus, legislatures may draw on common law principles to regulate a wide range 
of conduct pursuant to their police powers.96  The development of nuisance law has 
been described as a “functional dialogue” between the legislature and judiciary.97  
Because “property law has always been functional, encouraging behavior 
compatible with contemporary goals of the economy,”98 it is logical that property 
law has developed through similar “interplay”99 between legislative and judicial 
action. 
Just as courts have recognized that legislatures are empowered to prohibit 
“nuisance-like”100 conduct, courts also have recognized that states may exercise 
their police powers by drawing upon public trust principles.101  For example, the 
New Jersey legislature expanded and codified the holdings of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in a series of regulations granting expansive public access to the 
shoreline.102  Similarly, North Carolina has stated that the legislature may “modify 
any prior common law understanding of the geographic limits of the[] public trust 
                                                                    
95  John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 Colum. J. Envtl. 
L. 1, 8–9 (1993) (footnotes omitted). 
96  See id. at 17–18 (discussing history of statutory nuisances and their ability to meet changing 
conditions). 
97  Babcock, supra note 35, at 22 n.113 (citing Memorandum from Professor Zygmunt Plater, 
Boston College Law School, to Cotton Harness, General Counsel, South Carolina Coastal Council 
(Nov. 14, 1992) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review)). 
98  Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 45 Stan. L. Rev 1433, 1447 (1993).  See generally Joseph William Singer, The Rule of 
Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1369, 1425 (2013). 
99  Babcock, supra note 35, at 22 n.113. 
100  Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.20 (1987). 
101  Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 1, at 595–96. 
102  Id. at 594.  The Public Access to Waterfront rule requires that coastal owners “provide 
permanent perpendicular and linear access to the waterfront to the maximum event practical, 
including both visual and physical access.”  N.J. Admin. Code § 7:7E-8.11(b) (2006).  The Hudson 
Waterfront Walkway rule requires paved paths and walkways to provide access to the shore.  N.J. 
Admin. Code § 7:7E-4.38 (2006). 
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rights.”103  Such legislative expansion has been upheld against takings challenges.104 
Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that there is more leeway in 
expansive applications of background principles in areas that have been 
traditionally subject to regulation by the state.105  “When takings plaintiffs bring 
challenges based on property uses that have traditionally been subject to regulation, 
those claims can be summarily rejected at the threshold level, albeit with 
recognition . . . that ‘a law does not become a background principle . . . by enactment 
itself.’”106 
C.  Legislation Granting the Public the Right to Use the Intertidal Land for 
General Recreation Is a Valid Application of the Evolving Background 
Principles of the Public Trust Doctrine 
Legislation expanding the public’s right to use the land below the high tide line 
for general recreation is a valid application of a background principle of state law.  
First, the legislature should be given deference in determining the best uses to 
which the public may put the land it unquestionably has a right to access.  In the 
following section, I provide recommendations about how a legislature may 
formulate such a law.  Second, such legislation can be a background principle, 
despite contrary holdings by the state courts.  Finally, owners of land abutting the 
ocean do not have reasonable, investment-backed expectations of an unfettered 
right to exclude the public. 
1. Courts Should Defer to the Legislature’s Application of the Public 
Trust Doctrine 
Title to public trust land is held by the owner while beneficial ownership over 
the land is held by the public.107  As the representative of the public, the legislature’s 
determinations about the best uses of trust property are entitled to deference.  A 
legislative finding that public beach recreation is beneficial should not be 
                                                                    
103  Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 195 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that legislation 
authorizing the public to drive over privately owned beaches did not constitute a taking, noting 
that some public access to privately owned beaches was customary in North Carolina). 
104  See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 64 F. Supp. 2d 354, 358 (D.N.J. 
1999).  But see Galt v. Montana, 731 P.2d 912, 916 (Mont. 1987) (finding unconstitutional legislation 
that expanded the state’s common law rule by requiring property owners to build structures to 
facilitate use of public trust lands). 
105  Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 357. 
106  Id. at 357 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001)). 
107  See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). 
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contravened by judicial activism or reliance on a centuries-old ordinance.108 
Many states have identified public recreation as a valid public trust use.109  The 
New Jersey Supreme Court had “no difficulty finding that, in this latter half of the 
twentieth century, the public rights in tidal lands are not limited to the ancient 
prerogatives of navigation and fishing, but extend as well to recreational uses.”110  
Neither have the courts of California,111 North Carolina,112 Washington,113 Rhode 
Island,114 Wisconsin,115 Michigan,116 or Hawaii.117 
Beach recreation has social value in the modern era that makes it worthy of 
protecting with the public trust doctrine.  In colonial times, fishing, fowling, and 
navigation were vital for sustenance and commerce.118  Today, the primary social 
value of the beach is recreation.119  The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged 
the value of recreation, noting that the “popularity for recreational uses [of the 
beach] and open space are much heavier [than in the past], and their importance to 
the public welfare has become much more apparent.”120 
Precluding recreational use of the beach deprives a state of the profits of its 
natural resources.  Tourism and recreation are more commercially valuable today 
                                                                    
108  See Lazarus, supra note 66, at 1427 (discussing Justice O’Connor’s concern with judges 
intruding on legislative functions of factfinding and policymaking). 
109  See District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1083 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting 
national trend expanding the doctrine to include recreation and collecting cases). 
110  Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972). 
111  Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (including “general recreation” 
as valid use of trust and noting that the “public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently 
flexible to encompass changing public needs” (citations omitted)). 
112  Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 191 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015). 
113  Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 103 P.3d 203, 205–06 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
114  Cavanaugh v. Town of Narragansett, No. WC 91-0496, 1997 WL 1098081, at *11–12 (R.I. Super. 
Ct. Oct. 10, 1997) (citing R.I. Const. art. I. § 17). 
115  Movrich v. Lobermeier, 889 N.W.2d 454, 465 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016). 
116  Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 62, 74 (Mich. 2005) (including “pleasure” and “walking along 
the lakeshore” as valid uses of trust property). 
117  Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State, 222 P.3d 441, 451 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009). 
118  See Fernandez, supra note 2, at 628–29. 
119  See, e.g., id. at 625–26 (noting that “maritime commerce no longer reigns as the most valuable 
or common use of the coast”); Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 1, at 589.  See generally Catherine 
Robinson Hall, Dockominiums: In Conflict with the Public Trust Doctrine, 24 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 331, 331 
(1990) (discussing the increase in recreational boating in the United States). 
120  Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 53 (N.J. 1972). 
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than are near-shore fishing and hunting.121  As one commenter noted, “the modern 
economic equivalent of the fishing net may be the beach blanket.”122 
Other than its instrumental value as a driver of commercial business, beach 
recreation also has independent social value.  Scholars have argued that historically, 
commerce was a valuable activity not only because it led to prosperity, but also 
because it fostered empathy and multicultural socialization.123  Professor Rose 
asserts that in the modern age, public recreation serves a similar socializing 
function.124  “Insofar as recreation educates and socializes us, it acts as a ‘social glue’ 
for everyone, not just those immediately engaged . . . . Like commerce, then, 
recreation has social and political overtones.”125 
The equalizing function of beach recreation is best served if the state provides 
public access and prevents monopolization of the communal resource.126  
Beachfront property is in high demand, and its rising value could lead to increased 
commodification.127  The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated: “[t]he public 
demand for beaches has increased with the growth of population and improvement 
of transportation facilities.  Furthermore, the projected demand for salt water 
swimming will not be met ‘unless the existing swimming capacities . . . are 
expanded.’”128 
The rule announced by the Massachusetts and Maine courts would allow these 
states to sell their public beaches, and their citizens would be left with no right to 
                                                                    
121  Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 1, at 589. 
122  Id. 
123  Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 711, 775 (1986).  Professor Sax has similarly argued that a conceptual underpinning of 
the public trust doctrine is that some interests are so “intrinsically important to every citizen that 
their free availability tends to mark the society as one of citizens rather than of serfs.”  Sax, supra 
note 1, at 484. 
124  Rose, supra note 123, at 775. 
125  Id. at 778, 779–80. 
126  Id. at 774 (defining “inherently public” property as property that is (1) “physically capable of 
monopolization” and (2) “most valuable when used by . . . the public at large”). 
127  See Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 53 (N.J. 1972) (“Remaining tidal water 
resources still in the ownership of the State are becoming very scarce, demands upon them by 
reason of increased population, industrial development and their popularity for recreational uses 
and open spaces are much heavier, and their importance to the public welfare has become more 
apparent.”); Lazarus, supra note 66, at 1424 (discussing the rapid and significant increase in price 
of beach property and noting that this illustrates the “increasingly commercial nature of real 
property”). 
128  Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 364 (N.J. 1984). 
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engage in beach recreation.129  It is a bleak prospect if a state legislature may divest 
the entire seashore to private developers and transform public trust property into a 
high-priced resort.130  The public would likely find little solace in its remaining right 
to engage in “fowling.” 
Professor Sax has argued that certain property interests are “the gifts of 
nature’s bounty” and therefore ought to be reserved for the public.131  Sandy beach 
is a scarce resource, available in only a limited number of states.132  It is the gateway 
between the land and sea, where our ancestors once emerged from the oceans onto 
the land.133  And it is particularly well suited to recreation.134  While citizens in the 
past may have appreciated this natural resource by fishing and boating, the modern 
beach user simply wishes to walk on the beach, sit in the sand, and look over the 
ocean. 
To achieve the social benefits of beach recreation, the public must be 
guaranteed the reasonable use of some land above the low tide line.135  If the 
“modern . . . equivalent of the fishing net [is] the beach blanket,”136 the public should 
be given a place to put the blanket down.  Just as legislatures can regulate “nuisance-
like”137 conduct, so too should they be able to grant “fishing-like” benefits. 
As indicated, states are given more leeway applying background principles in 
areas that have been traditionally subject to regulation by the state.138  The public 
trust doctrine has imposed limits on private ownership of this land since colonial 
times.139  The legislatures in Maine and Massachusetts could use these existing 
restrictions to expand public access. 
                                                                    
129  Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 568 (Mass. 1974). 
130  Matthews, 471 A.2d at 364. 
131  Sax, supra note 1, at 484. 
132  Matthews, 471 A.2d at 364. 
133  Many scientists believe that life began in the ocean.  See, e.g., J.B. Corliss et al., An 
Hypothesis Concerning the Relationship Between Submarine Hot Springs and the Origin of Life 
on Earth, Oceanologica Acta 59 (1981); Leslie E. Orgel, The Origin of Life on Earth, 271 Sci. Am. 76 
(1994). 
134  Matthews, 471 A.2d at 364 (“Oceanfront property is uniquely suitable for bathing and other 
recreational activities.” (quoting Lusardi v. Curtis Point Prop. Owners Ass’n, 430 A.2d 881, 886 (N.J. 
1981))). 
135  Id. 
136  Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 1, at 589. 
137  Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.20 (1987). 
138  See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 357. 
139  See Storer v. Freeman, 5 Mass. 435, 438 (1810).  See generally Fernandez, supra note 2. 
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First, legislation could grant a right to recreational access and base that right 
explicitly in public trust principles.  The proposed Act in Massachusetts provided 
only for an “on-foot right-of-way,” which was not tethered specifically to the 
existing public access rights.140  A future legislature could explicitly draw upon the 
public trust principles, explain its understanding of the needs of the public, and 
create substantive rules applying those principles to those needs. 
Second, legislation could grant recreational access rights grounded in a broad 
interpretation of the traditional uses.  For example, legislation could provide a 
public right to use the intertidal land for “aesthetic enjoyment of fish, fowl, and all 
other manner of wildlife, as well as the natural environment in which they inhabit.”  
Legislation could similarly provide a right of access for “navigation, including 
recreational on-foot navigation of the intertidal land itself, and all uses of the 
intertidal land ancillary to this navigation.”  The Maine SJC’s recent expansive 
reading of “navigation”141 indicates that this approach has potential to provide the 
desired public rights while satisfying concerns about past precedent and unfairness 
to property owners. 
To survive a takings challenge, the legislature should be explicit about the 
correlation between the modern right of recreation and the past rights of fishing, 
fowling, and navigation.  The legislature should conduct legislative factfinding 
about the most valuable modern use of the trust property.  More importantly, the 
legislature should conduct a historical inquiry into the traditional trust uses and 
explain how these public recreational rights derive from the same underlying 
principles. 
Armed with these doctrinal hooks, judges considering the constitutionality of 
such legislation should feel confident deferring to legislative findings.  By 
demonstrating that the right to access this land derives from the existing rights of 
the public, courts could comfortably hold that this reflects a background principle 
of state law and is thus immune from further takings inquiry. 
2. Recreational Use Is a Valid Application of Background Principles 
Despite Contrary Precedent 
Expanding trust uses to include recreation is a valid application of background 
                                                                    
140  Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (Mass. 1974). 
141  See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992); McGarvey v. Whittredge, 28 A.3d 
620, 636 (Me. 2011) (Saufley, C.J., concurring); Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 
(N.J. 1972). 
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principles of state law despite the rulings in the Opinion of the Justices142 and Bell.143  
While the Maine SJC in Bell held that there is no general recreational easement to 
the intertidal land as a matter of common law,144 such an easement can still be a 
background principle. 
 As a threshold matter, neither court analyzed the public right in light of the 
public trust doctrine.145  The courts analyzed the question by interpreting the 
ordinance and therefore failed to recognize that the public had preexisting common 
law rights.146  To the extent that the rights and limits on intertidal ownership are 
creatures of legislation, the legislature should be permitted to clarify or correct any 
judicial interpretation.147 
More importantly, the courts’ rejection of the argument that the public had a 
general recreational easement forty years ago does not foreclose future 
development of the background principle.  Background principles may expand in 
the face of changed circumstances and new knowledge.148  “The public trust 
doctrine, like all common law principles, should not be considered fixed or static, 
but should be molded and extended to meet . . . the needs of the public it was created 
to benefit.”149 
The Maine SJC has, in fact, continued to interpret and expand upon the public’s 
                                                                    
142  313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974). 
143  557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989). 
144  Id. at 174.  The Advisory Opinion did not separately address whether there was a common law 
public easement. 
145  See id.; Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561. 
146  See Bell, 557 A.2d at 174 (“[A]ll the cases in Massachusetts and Maine recognizing the common 
law principles of intertidal property interests read the Colonial Ordinance as having restricted the 
reserved public easement to fishing, fowling, and navigation and related uses.”). 
147  Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 71 (1851).  Massachusetts courts have generally not 
interpreted the rights as legislative.  The SJC has stated that the ordinance created “a legal right 
and vested interest in the soil, and not a mere permissive indulgence, or gratuitous license, given 
without consideration, and to be revoked and annulled at the pleasure of those who gave it.”  Id. 
148  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992).  Although Justice Scalia’s examples 
of “changed circumstances” are impending disasters, “background principles” can apply to laws 
that are benefit-conferring as well as harm-preventing.  See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 
332-33; Lazarus, supra note 66, at 1428.  The most obvious “changed circumstance” relating to a 
benefit-conferring law would likely be a change in the needs of the beneficiaries. 
149  Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972).  As Blumm and Ritchie point out, 
“[t]he public trust is surely no exception to [Lucas’s] acknowledgment” that “background principles 
may have the potential to evolve beyond their historical scope.”  Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, 
at 343. 
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access rights since Bell.  In McGarvey v. Whittredge,150 the court held that the public 
has the right to cross the intertidal land for the purposes of scuba diving.151  In a split 
opinion, three justices would have held that the public trust doctrine in fact does 
grant the public the right to access the intertidal land for uses beyond fishing, 
fowling, and navigation.152  Chief Justice Saufley acknowledged the need for 
ongoing development of this area of law: 
The common law, with “its flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation,” has 
continually evolved to reflect the realities of a changing world.  As this unique body of 
common law has developed, generations of jurists have searched for a basic set of 
principles to govern the ownership and use of the intertidal land.153 
The remainder of the panel concurred in the result, but maintained that the 
public rights were limited to the traditional categories.154  However, those justices 
held that scuba diving fell within a broad reading of “navigation.”155  Either way, the 
holding in McGarvey demonstrates that public access rights in Maine are not static, 
and seriously undercuts the precedential value of Bell. 
Legislatures and courts should be permitted to fix doctrinal imperfections in 
the common law.  The New Jersey legislature has “codified and expanded” the 
holdings of the New Jersey Supreme Court by codifying public right-of-ways to 
provide beach access.156  A North Carolina court has recently held that the legislature 
may “modify any prior common law understanding of the geographic limits of the[] 
public trust rights.”157 
Further, there are reasons that these state courts should reexamine the 
reasoning of some past opinions delineating the rights of the public.  As a matter of 
statutory interpretation, the Massachusetts SJC ordinarily applies a presumption 
against alienation of trust property in a manner that lessens public uses.158  Instead, 
                                                                    
150  28 A.3d 620 (Me. 2011). 
151  Id. at 636 (Saufley, C.J., concurring). 
152  Id. at 635.  
153  Id. at 624 (citation omitted) (quoting Pendexter v. Pendexter, 363 A.2d 743, 749 (Me. 1976)). 
154  Id. at 642 (Levy, J., concurring). 
155  Id. 
156  Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 1, at 594. 
157  Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 195 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015). 
158  See Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 126 (Mass. 1966) (narrowly 
construing a grant of public land to private entity that “seem[ed], in part at least, a commercial 
venture for private profit” and inconsistent with public uses); see also Sax, supra note 1, at 494 
(discussing Gould and the SJC’s skepticism towards questionable diversions of trust property into 
private hands). 
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courts have repeatedly construed the ordinance narrowly against the state, first by 
finding the express public rights to be exhaustive,159 and in Massachusetts, by 
interpreting those rights narrowly.160  This interpretation is particularly unusual 
because grants from the government to private individuals should be construed 
against the grantee.161 
Courts should apply a corollary presumption in favor of legislation, like the 
Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act and the proposed Massachusetts law, which 
furthers the purpose of the trust property.162  Instead, the courts gave no deference 
to the legislatures’ determinations about the best uses of public trust property.163 
The attempt to constitutionalize a colonial ordinance forty years ago should not 
dissuade the Massachusetts and Maine legislatures from enacting laws to bring the 
public’s access rights into conformity with modern needs.  The holding in Bell has 
already been significantly undercut by judicial expansion of public access rights in 
McGarvey.  The Massachusetts opinion is a mere advisory opinion, and the 
legislature is in no way restrained from passing the law and giving the SJC a more 
adequate basis for the legislation.164 
Many of the cases cited in the Opinion of the Justices165 are more than one hundred 
                                                                    
159  See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 174 (Me. 1989); Wellfleet v. Glaze, 525 N.E.2d 1298, 
1302–05 (Mass. 1988); Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (Mass. 1974). 
160  See Wellfleet, 525 N.E.2d at 1302–05 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (finding that “[a]quaculture is 
not fishing, nor can it legitimately be considered a ‘natural derivative’ of the right to fish”). 
161  See, e.g., Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 
420, 548–49 (1837) (applying canon that grants made by the government to individuals be 
construed against the grantee); Bos. Elevated Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 39 N.E.2d 87, 113 (Mass. 
1942) (holding that when the government makes a grant to a citizen, it will be construed against 
the grantee).  The ordinance is the type of grant that the SJC would usually review with suspicion 
as one that effectuates a handout of public property to private landowners in contravention of 
public purposes.  See Sax, supra note 1, at 494. 
162  See Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 406 (1842) (requiring clear statement for 
state divestment of trust property); Kiawah Dev. Partners, II v. S.C. Dep’t. of Health and Envtl. 
Control, 766 S.E.2d 707, 721–23 (S.C. 2014) (considering public trust principles in interpreting 
regulations); Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: A 
Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 Envtl. L. 573, 578–79 (1989) (identifying “rule of 
construction” as a proper use of the public trust doctrine). 
163  Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 565–68. 
164  See Opinion of the Justices, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1106 (Mass. 1981) (“[A]nything we say as to the 
construction of the statute would in no way affect the power of the Legislature to pass any bill it 
sees fit to pass, or to declare the bill’s intended meaning, within the limits of the Constitution.”). 
165  Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 566. 
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years old.166  Fishing, fowling, and navigation may have been an appropriate, 
exhaustive list at the time.167  These older opinions were also interpreting the 
ordinance without clarification from the modern legislature.  Future legislation 
could make explicit findings regarding the value of public recreation, concerns 
about commodification of beachfront property, and the conceptual similarity 
between recreation and the traditional trust uses.168 
That the state law has put its imprimatur on an opposite interpretation does 
not preclude it from becoming a background principle.169  Courts can distinguish 
and interpret these past cases in ways that are “objectively reasonable”170 in light of 
social change and new legislation.  Thus, future legislation expanding permissible 
trust uses to include recreation could reflect a “background principle of state law” 
even in the face of contrary precedent. 
3. Beachfront Property Owners Do Not Have a Reasonable 
Expectation to Unilaterally Exclude the Public 
Beachfront property owners do not have a reasonable expectation to exclude 
the public from the intertidal land.171  The public unquestionably has the right to 
access this land for certain uses.172  Landowners purchased this land subject to a 
preexisting public trust.  They cannot have a reasonable expectation that this 
amorphous, pre-constitutional public right of access will become frozen in time at 
                                                                    
166  See, e.g., Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 422 (1909); Butler v. Attorney 
Gen., 80 N.E. 688 (Mass. 1907); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 66 (1851). 
167  While a long common law tradition could ordinarily make it more difficult to justify a change 
in the law, many of these cases were decided before the rise in beach recreation as its predominant 
use.  See Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 1, at 587–88. 
168  See supra notes 110–30 and accompanying text. 
169  See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 456 (2011) (holding that owner 
of water rights could not rely on an “absence of contrary finding” by the state courts to claim its 
use was lawful, and noting that the “public trust and reasonable use doctrines are self-executing, 
as well as evolving, and do not therefore lend themselves to such a static interpretation”). 
170  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 n.18 (1992). 
171  While “reasonable, investment-backed expectations” are traditionally analyzed as a factor in 
the Penn Central test, the inquiry is similarly appropriate while considering whether legislation is 
a “background principle” of state law.  The Court recently addressed the “denominator question,” 
in which a court considering a takings challenge must first identify the proper “unit of property 
against which to assess the effect of the challenged governmental action.”  Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 
S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017).  To determine the “denominator,” courts must consider, among other 
things, the “reasonable expectations of an acquirer of land.”  Id. at 1945–46. 
172  See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 172–73 (Me. 1989); Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 438 
(1810). 
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the instant that they acquire title to the property.173  This is particularly true in light 
of the general trend expanding beach access rights in Maine and across the 
country.174 
It would certainly be improper for a legislature to grant a public recreational 
easement over private property without providing compensation as a matter of 
course.  Landowners have reasonable expectations that the legislature will not do 
so.  But this is not ordinary property. 
First, the public already has the right to use the property for certain purposes.  
Therefore, any concern that allowing public recreation would give legislators carte 
blanche to designate public easements is misplaced; such a rule would be limited to 
the incredibly narrow situation in which the public has broad, preexisting access 
rights. 
Second, the land in question is unique.  Sandy intertidal land abutting the 
ocean is a limited resource well suited to public recreation.175  States are entitled 
greater latitude in the regulation of natural resource-land than other similar 
property, and homeowners are aware of this latitude.176 
Third, the existing public rights demonstrate that recreational uses will not 
contravene landowners’ reasonable expectations.  General recreation is not 
materially different than fishing, fowling, or navigation from the perspective of the 
landowner.  It is hardly defensible to say that a homeowner invests with the 
“reasonable expectation” that she will look from her window and see someone 
                                                                    
173  S. W. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist., 212 P.3d 1, 7 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2008) (“Landowners whose property adjoins a natural watercourse assume the burden of the 
location they have chosen.”). 
174  It is true that not all states are expanding beach access rights.  However, the debate usually 
involves whether the public may access the dry sand, not whether it may engage in certain 
activities in the wet sand.  See generally Erika Kranz, Sand for the People: The Continuing Controversy 
Over Public Access to Florida’s Beaches, 83 Fla. B.J. 11 (2009). 
175  Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 364 (N.J. 1984) (“Oceanfront property 
is uniquely suitable for bathing and other recreational activities.” (quoting Lusardi v. Curtis Point 
Prop. Owners Ass’n, 430 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1981))). 
176  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Coastal 
property may present such unique concerns for a fragile land system that the State can go further 
in regulating its development and use than the common law of nuisance might otherwise 
permit.”); see Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945–46 (2017) (“[I]t may be relevant that the 
property is located in an area that is subject to, or likely be subject to, environmental or other 
regulation.”); Lazarus, supra note 66, at 1422 (“[T]he fragile, ever-shifting ground near the 
shoreline is not like most places.”). 
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walking with a fishing pole and a cooler, but not a book and a blanket.177  It is unlikely 
that Maine homeowners invest with the expectation that they will allow access to 
beachgoers in scuba suits, but not bathing suits.178 
Fourth, public rights such as the public trust doctrine are flexible.  These public 
rights may be expanded to meet modern needs,179 and the rights of individual 
owners are subject to limitations in the face of such changes.180  For example, the 
public has always had rights related to commerce and navigation, but these were 
extended to apply to navigable airspace.181  The U.S. Supreme Court stated that, “[t]o 
recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways, seriously 
interfere with their control and development in the public interest, and transfer 
into private ownership that to which only the public has a claim.”182 
Fifth, there is a legal trend toward the expansion of recreational beach access.  
In Good v. United States,183 the Federal Circuit rejected a takings claim brought by a 
developer who had been denied a permit to build on wetlands.184  Because “rising 
environmental awareness translated into ever-tightening land use restrictions,” 
and because the owner “was not oblivious to this trend,” the court found that he had 
no reasonable investment-backed expectations to be able to build.185  Thus, his 
takings claim was denied despite the fact that he was unable to pursue any 
economically viable development project.186 
Similarly, it is hard to imagine that Massachusetts and Maine shoreline-
                                                                    
177  See Fernandez, supra note 2, at 636 n.84 (“[A] hiker that carries a fishing rod could proceed 
unto the same property that would be closed to her if the fishing rod were missing.”). 
178  See McGarvey v. Whittredge, 28 A.3d 620, 635–37 (Me. 2011) (finding a right to use intertidal 
land for purposes of scuba diving). 
179  U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946). 
180  Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (Mass. 1974) (“It has been held proper to interfere 
with the private property rights of coastal owners in the tidal area for purposes reasonably related 
to the protection or promotion of fishing or navigation without paying compensation.”). 
181  See Causby, 328 U.S. at 264 (“We have said that the airspace is a public highway.”). 
182  Id. at 261; Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(“‘[B]ackground principles’ of long-standing federal property law indicate that there is no private 
property right in the navigable airspace of the United States.”). 
183  189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
184  Id. at 1357–58, 1363. 
185  Id. at 1362. 
186  Id. at 1362–63. 
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property holders are “oblivious”187 to the anomalous nature of their state laws.  As 
indicated, coastal states have generally expanded the rights of the public to include 
recreation.188  Many states retain the traditional high tide line,189  but others have 
gone further and increased the physical scope of the publicly available land.  New 
Jersey has used the public trust doctrine to expand the scope of the trust to include 
all municipally owned dry sand beach.190  That right was later extended to apply to 
privately owned dry sand beach whenever it is necessary to provide “reasonable 
access” to the wet sand.191  Other states, such as North Carolina192 and Oregon,193 
have similarly extended public access to include dry sand beaches using the doctrine 
of custom.  Hawaii, relying on traditional Hawaiian principles, extends public 
rights to the brush line.194 
While knowledge of a legal trend is not itself determinative,195 social awareness 
of national trends is relevant in determining a party’s reasonable expectations.196  
The fact that Maine law has in fact continued to evolve in this area emphasizes the 
landowners’ lack of expectations that the public’s rights are static.197 
                                                                    
187  Cf. id. at 1362 (suggesting that defendant must have been aware of trend toward stricter land 
use laws). 
188  See supra notes 102–09 and accompanying text. 
189  See, e.g., Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 564 n.17 (Conn. 2001) (noting that public 
trust allows the public to access land between the mean high tide line and the water); McQueen v. 
S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119–20 (S.C. 2003) (“The State has the exclusive right to control 
land below the high water mark for the public benefit.”). 
190  See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 358 (N.J. 1984) (citing Neptune 
City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972)) (“In Avon we held that the public trust applied 
to the municipally owned dry sand beach immediately landward of the high water mark.”). 
191  Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365–66.  The court did not address the extent of this reasonable access 
over private property.  Id. at 369 (“All we decide here is that private land is not immune from a 
possible right of access to the foreshore for swimming or bathing purposes, nor is it immune from 
the possibility that some of the dry sand may be used by the public incidental to the right of 
bathing and swimming.”). 
192  Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 195–96 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015). 
193  State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 677–78 (Or. 1969). 
194  In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 77 (Haw. 1968). 
195  See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629–30 (2001). 
196  See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034–35 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“Property is bought and sold, investments are made, subject to the State’s power to regulate . . . . 
The expectations protected by the Constitution are based on objective rules and customs that can 
be understood as reasonable by all parties involved.”). 
197  See McGarvey v. Whittredge, 28 A.3d 260, 624 (Me. 2011). 
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Finally, the owners’ expectations should be considered against the backdrop of 
a property interest that is in constant flux even without the public trust doctrine.  
The natural high tide and low tide lines regularly shift as a function of natural 
erosion, intentional human intervention, and a combination thereof.198  Title to 
previously dry land that becomes submerged or intertidal transfers automatically to 
the state if it is the result of certain forms of natural erosion.199  Generally, new sandy 
beachfront that is created by a rapid process belongs to the state, whether it occurs 
by natural causes or a state-funded sand nourishment project.200  Regardless of the 
strict approach taken as to this issue in Massachusetts,201 beachfront owners 
acquire property with the knowledge that the exact scope of their property interest 
is subject to change. 
Given the broad national trend toward recreational beach access, the ephemeral 
nature of beach property itself, and Maine’s continued expansion of public rights, 
intertidal land owners do not have a reasonable expectation in the unfettered right 
to exclude the public from the beach. 
C ONC L US I ON 
The courts and legislatures of Maine and Massachusetts should not be bound 
by their predecessors in determining the scope of public rights.  The land between 
the high and low tide lines is held by the landowners for the benefit of the public.  As 
                                                                    
198  Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 191 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (“None of these natural 
lines of demarcation are static, as the beaches are continually changing due to erosion or accretion 
of stand, whether through the forces of nature or through human intervention.”); Lazarus, supra 
note 66, at 1422. 
199  Nies, 780 S.E.2d at 191 (noting that the State acquires ownership of public trust in dry sand 
beaches if they are created through public-funded beach nourishment projects); see Coburg Dairy, 
Inc. v. Lesser, 458 S.E.2d 547 (S.C. 1995) (holding that wetlands created by the encroachment of 
navigable tidal water belong to the State); TH Investments, Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine, L.P., 217 
S.W.3d 173, 196 (Tex. App. 2007) (holding that submersion of land transferred title from private to 
state ownership, and that this transfer did not constitute a taking). 
200  See Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 709 (2010) 
(“[F]ormerly submerged land that has become dry land by avulsion continues to belong to the 
owner of the seabed (usually the State).”).  The Massachusetts SJC has applied the opposite rule 
and held that title to previously submerged land that was converted into a sandy beach by the state 
for purposes of creating a public beach vested in the abutting landowner.  Michaelson v. Silver 
Beach Improvement Ass’n, 173 N.E.2d 273, 277–78 (Mass. 1961).  That holding is anomalous and 
represents clear judicial activism that transferred land that was literally created by the state for 
the benefit of the public into private ownership. 
201  Michaelson, 173 N.E.2d at 277–78. 
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the representative of public will, the legislature is entitled to deference as to the best 
uses of the public’s trust property. 
Aside from democratic principles, practical considerations of modern life 
counsel toward expanding the permissible public uses of intertidal land.  To meet 
the changed circumstances of modern life, the legislature should be permitted to 
codify the background public trust principles into clearly defined substantive rules.  
The area between land and sea is of historic significance, which is why it has always 
been treated as special by the common law.  Modern society should be empowered 
to use this unique and beneficial property in ways that are best suited to its needs. 
These goals are not merely aspirational, but achievable.  By explicitly basing 
legislation on the analogy to the public’s preexisting access rights, by defining 
recreational rights in terms of the traditional trust uses, and by engaging in 
legislative factfinding about the need for this modification, a legislature could 
present courts with a fuller understanding of why the right is necessary.  Armed 
with such legislation, the Maine and Massachusetts courts could find that, in fact, 
the public has the right to enjoy the beach after all. 
